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Abstract 
 
International counterfeiting affects adversely producers, consumers and 
domestic economies. Some attempts have been made in the last years by 
international organisations (European Union, World Trade Organisation) to deal with 
this complex problem. Though some success has been achieved, the number of 
seizures of counterfeited goods detected in the external borders of EU has 
increased. This study examines the impact of Hofstede’s cultural variables (power 
distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance) on the level of 
counterfeiting in European countries.  
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I. Introduction 
 
In the last years counterfeiting and piracy have grown considerably to a point 
where they have now become a widespread phenomenon with a global impact. The 
phenomenon has gone hand in hand  with the steady growth of international trade, 
the internationalisation of the economy, the expansion of the communication 
infrastructures and the collapse of the political systems in central and eastern Europe 
and in the former Soviet Union [CEC, 1998]. Also Asian region, particularly China, 
represents the source of more than 60% of the fakes stopped by Customs in Europe, 
as stated by European Commissioner in charge of taxation and customs union.  
According to the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau (CIB), set up by the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the increase of value of counterfeiting as 
a percentage of world trade rose massively from about 3,6% in 1990 to 5,6% in 1995. 
European companies have lost between 400 and 800 million Euros within the Union, 
but 2000 million Euros outside it [CEC, 1999]. The extent of the losses and the 
geographic spread of the phenomenon have become a focal point of international 
discussion (World Trade Organisation - WTO, European Union - EU), government 
action (USA) and corporate responses [Green and Smith, 2002]. Due to its scale, 
counterfeiting and piracy have a damaging effect not only on businesses, national 
economies and consumers, but also on society as a whole.  
Scholars in international business have dealt with counterfeiting by 
investigating anti-counterfeiting strategies [Chaudhry and Walsh, 1996; Green and 
Smith, 2002], examining common counterfeiting methods [Harvey and Ronkainen, 
1985], researching bribery and corruption [Tanzi, 1998; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; 
Sanyal and Samanta, 2004] and evaluating the economic consequences of 
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international product counterfeiting [Globerman, 1988]. However, studies which focus 
primarily on the causes or factors that promote counterfeiting are scanty and are all 
related with intellectual property rights protection [Ronkainen and Cusumano, 2001; 
Bender, 2002; Andrés, 2002; Javorcik, 2002, Aryanto, 2003]. 
There are two empirical facts that motivate this paper. First, the increased 
seizures of counterfeited goods in the external border of EU, and the increasingly 
international concern about the problem. Second, the volatility of the seizures by EU 
member countries, suggesting that some host countries are more vulnerable to 
counterfeiters than others. 
This paper adopts a dual approach in assessing the impact of counterfeiting 
on EU. First, some data on seizures in the EU countries are analyzed in order to 
approach the size and evolution of the phenomenon. Then, we search for the impact 
of four cultural variables on the level of counterfeiting detected in European countries 
to understand why some countries are more vulnerable than others. 
The essential legal framework background and definition of counterfeiting are 
presented in section 1. Section 2 defines the nature and extent of the counterfeiting 
phenomenon in the EU member states. Section 3 presents a literature review on the 
linkages between the Hofstede’s cultural variables (power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, incertainty avoidance) and counterfeiting. Study methodology is detailed 
in section 4, and the results of descriptive statistics are presented in section 5. Finally 
the paper concludes with recommendations for the development of culturally 
sensitive public policies that will be effective in the fight against counterfeiting. 
 
 
II. Defining counterfeiting 
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The work of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) provide the legal framework for the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights and the limiting of trade of counterfeited goods. According 
to the TRIPs agreement, the owner of a registered trademark has the exclusive right 
to prevent all third parties from using an identical or similar mark without the owner’s 
consent, if this use would create a likelihood of confusion (article 15). 
In the European Union, Regulation (EC) n. 3295/94 states that counterfeited 
goods are those bearing a trademark that is identical to, or indistinguishable from, a 
trademark registered to another party and infringes the rights of the holder of the 
trademark. Pirated goods are copies that were made without the consent of the 
holder of the copyright or related rights. 
According to the Green Paper [CEC, 1998],  the concepts of counterfeiting and 
piracy cover all products, processes and services which are the subject-matter or 
result of an infrigement of an intellectual property right (trade mark or trade name, 
industrial design or model, patent, utility model and geographical indication), of a 
copyright or neighbouring right (the rights of performing artists, the rights of 
producers of sound recordings, the rights of the producers of the first fixations of 
films, the rights of broadcasting organisations), or of the “sui generis” right of the 
maker of a data base. This wide scope definition allows to cover not only the case of 
products which are copied fraudulently (fakes), but also the case of products which 
are identical to the original ones but which are made without the rightholder’s 
consent. Piracy in the services sphere covers mainly broadcast services and services 
linked to the development of the information society. 
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The definition does not cover look-alike products (duplication of the original 
product and bearing different names, but not a private label of a branded industrial 
product), reproductions that are not exact copies or unconvincing imitations. 
The absence of a uniform international definition of counterfeiting and piracy 
raise problems in delimitating the boundaries of legal and illegal pratices. On the side 
of intellectual property right-holders, the incentive is to extend the boundaries to 
include pratices that some observers would deem legitimate manifestations of 
competition. The international organisations (WTO, EU) role is to maintain the legal 
infrastructure surrounding intellectual property, but it should not create incentives for 
anti-competitive or other rent-seeking behaviours beyond those already inherent to 
the acquisition of an exclusive property right [Globerman, 1988; OCDE, 1998]. 
As there is no generally agreed clear demarcation between piracy and 
counterfeiting, this paper will refer to all cases as counterfeiting, as collected by the 
services of European Comission. 
 
III. Patterns of counterfeiting in the external border of European 
Union (2002/2004) 
 
The statistics of seizures between 2002 and 2004 show that the amount of 
counterfeited and pirated articles seized at the EU’s external borders is continuing to 
increase in all countries. During this period, 39 595 cases were reported by the 
Customs Authorities of the 15 European Union countries. The largest numbers come 
from Germany (11 980 cases), France (5 739 cases) and United Kingdom (5 677 
cases). There was significant increases between 2002 and 2004 in Italy (+658%), 
Austria (+756%), Netherlands (230%), France (200%) and Spain (190%). Smaller 
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countries like Portugal, Greece and Luxembourg reported also the smalest number of 
cases (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Number of cases registered in the external border of EU, by country 
(2002/2004) 
 
2002 2003 2004 Countries 
N % N % N % 
France 1083 14,3 1410      13,2 3246 15,2
Luxembourg 55 0,8 71 0,6 193 0,9
Denmark 212 2,8 515 4,8 544 2,6
Belgium 396 5,2 830 7,8 929 4,4
United Kingdom 1125 14,9 2017 18,8 2535 11,9
Italy 157 2,1 297 2,8 1190 5,6
Netherlands 544 7,2 905 8,5 1794 8,4
Spain 439 5,8 761 7,1 1274 6,0
Austria 155 2,1 331 3,1 1327 6,2
Finland 182 2,4 170 1,6 135 0,6
Ireland 292 3,9 347 3,3 675 3,2
Sweden 253 3,3 396 3,7 540 2,5
Portugal 48 0,6 63 0,5 73 0,3
Germany 2583 34,2 2587 24,2 6810 31,9
Greece 29 0,4 9 0,0 68 0,3
Total 7553 100,0 10709 100,0 21333 100,0
Source: TAXUD, 2006. 
 
The type of products confiscated by the customs officials (Table 2) included 
clothing and accessories (63% of cases in 2004), media (18,4% in 2002) and 
watches and jewellery (10% in 2004). In the period, only the number of seizures in 
clothing and accessories (+218%), media (+100%) and toys and games (+98%) 
faced a significant increase. These counterfeited products threaten the health and 
safety of EU consumers, their jobs, community competitiveness, trade and 
investment in research and innovation. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Number of cases registered on the external border of EU, by product type 
(2002/2004) 
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2002 2003 2004 (a) Product type 
N % N % N % 
Foodstuffs, alcoholic and 
other drinks 
13 0,2 17 0,2 53 0,0
Perfumes and cosmetics 37 0,4 116 1,1 214 1,0
Clothing and accessories 4380 58,0 5891 55,0 13928 63,0
Electrical Equipment 283 3,7 200 1,9 829 4,0
Computer equipment 22 0,3 43 0,4 122 1,0
CD (audio, software, 
etc.), DVD 
1388 18,4 1898 17,7 2785 12,0
Watches and jewellery 572 7,6 1098 10,3 2201 10,0
Toys and games 261 3,5 497 4,6 517 2,0
Cigarettes - - 130 1,2 316 1,0
Other goods 597 7,9 820 7,7 1346 6,0
Total 7553 100,0 10709 100,0 22311 100,0
Source: TAXUD, 2006.(a) EU25. 
 
Table 3 lists the three most counterfeited brands, by product. The image of 
counterfeited merchandise in the external borders of the EU member countries 
tended to center on Boss, Calvin Klein and Armani perfumes, Nike and Adidas 
sportswear, Ralph Lauren polo shirts, Nokia cellular phones, Rolex watches and 
Nintendo games. The well-known brands Sony, Intel and Hewlett-Packard were 
ranked in the first place during this period on items related with computer equipment. 
IFPI (The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), who represents the 
majority of record producers worldwide, and MPA (Motion Picture Association), 
similar organisation to the movie industry, reported an increased number of pirated 
CD’s and DVD’s.  
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Table 3. Three most counterfeited brands (number of cases), by product type 
(2002/2004) 
 
2002 2003 2004 Product type 
1º 2º 3º 1º 2º 3º 1º 2º 3º 
Foodstuffs, 
alcoholic and 
other drinks 
Charl-
es 
Disney Grant’s Disney Aust. 
Apples
Konar 
Lebe 
Lipton Spirits 
Prod 
Inter 
Coca 
Cola 
Perfumes 
and 
cosmetics 
Boss Calvin 
Klein 
Gucci Boss Armani Vuitton Beier-
sdorf 
P & G L’Oréal
Clothing and 
accessories 
Nike Adidas Ralph 
Lauren
Vuitton Nike Bur- 
berrys 
Vuitton Nike Adidas
Electrical 
Equipment 
Nokia Philips Pana- 
sonic 
Nokia Philips Sony Philips Nokia Osram
Computer 
equipment 
Sony Epson Philips Intel  Philips Epson HP Sam-
sung 
Sisvel 
CD (audio, 
software, 
etc.), DVD 
MPA IFPI Nin- 
tendo 
MPA IFPI Philips Philips FACT Philip 
Morris 
Watches and 
jewellery 
Rolex Brei- 
tling 
Gucci Rolex Brei-
tling 
Cartier Rolex Adidas Gucci 
Toys and 
games 
Taiwan 
Moto 
Nin- 
tendo 
Disney Nin-
tendo 
Hasbro Disney Kona-
mi 
Upper 
Desck 
Disney
Cigarettes - - - Philip 
Morris 
Reem-
tsma 
Imp. 
Tob. 
Philip 
Morris 
Imp. 
Tob. 
Galla-
her 
Other goods Nokia Pfizer Disney Nokia Pfizer Disney Dura-
cell 
Bic Pfizer 
Source: TAXUD, 2006. 
 
Table 4 shows the three most important countries of origin of the goods seized 
by the customs authorities of the European Union. The vast majority of counterfeited 
products arrived from China (toys and games), Thailand (clothing and accessories) 
and Hong Kong (computer equipment). Turkey and United Arab Emirates (perfumes 
and cosmetics) were very common sources too. European countries like Poland, 
Ukraine and Russia were also involved in the production of counterfeited goods. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Three most counterfeiters countries (number of cases), by product type 
(2002/2004) 
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2002 2003 2004 Product type 
1º 2º 3º 1º 2º 3º 1º 2º 3º 
Foodstuffs, 
alcoholic and 
other drinks 
Thai- 
land 
China Turkey Turkey Poland Chile Russia Ukrai-
ne 
Domi-
nican 
Rep. 
Perfumes 
and 
cosmetics 
Turkey Spain China UAE Turkey Thai-
land 
UAE Turkey USA 
Clothing and 
accessories 
Thai- 
land 
Turkey China Thai-
land 
China Turkey China Thai-
land 
Turkey
Electrical 
Equipment 
China Hong 
Kong 
Turkey China Hong 
Kong 
Taiwan China Hong 
Kong 
UAE 
Computer 
equipment 
Hong 
Kong 
Taiwan China China Hong 
Kong 
UAE China Hong 
Kong 
Russia
CD (audio, 
software, 
etc.), DVD 
Thai- 
land 
Malay- 
sia 
Bel- 
gium 
Thai-
land 
Malay-
sia 
Pakis-
tan 
China Thai-
land 
Malay-
sia 
Watches and 
jewellery 
Thai- 
land 
Hong 
Kong 
China Thai-
land 
China Hong 
Kong 
China Hong 
Kong 
Thai-
land 
Toys and 
games 
China Thai- 
land 
Hong 
Kong 
China Thai-
land 
Hong 
Kong 
China India Hong 
Kong 
Cigarettes - - - Poland China Russia Poland China Ukrain
e 
Other goods China USA Hong 
Kong 
China Hong 
Kong 
India China India Hong 
Kong 
Source: TAXUD, 2005. Notes: UAE – United Arab Emirates. 
 
IV. Culture and counterfeiting 
 
Lacking prior empirical evidence on the linkage between counterfeiting and 
culture, we propose that the presence of counterfeiting in a host country is not culture 
free. Culture “is a system that enables individuals and groups to deal with each other 
and the outside world” [Mole, 2003, p.8]. Lewis [1999, p.2] argues that “people of 
different cultures share basic concepts but view them from different angles and 
perspectives, leading them to behave in a manner which we may consider irrational 
or even in contradiction of what we hold sacred”. One useful paradigm to study the 
impact of national culture on individual behaviour is Hoftede’s model. Hofstede [1991] 
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defined culture at national level in terms of four dimensions: large versus small power 
distance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, and strong 
versus weak uncertainty avoidance. A fifth dimension was developed [Hofstede and 
Bond, 1988], confucian dynamism, which deals with time perceptions (long term 
versus short term orientation). However, this variable was not included in our study 
due to a lack of data for all European countries.  
 
4.1. Counterfeiting and Hofstede’s power distance 
Power distance refers to “the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally” [Hofstede, 1991]. People who possess large power distance 
values are accepting of gaps in power and believe that there is an order of inequality 
in the world and that everybody has a predetermined place. Small power distance 
people are unaccepting of inequality and believe that power should be distributed 
evenly. 
Power distance is the cultural dimension most related to the perception of 
corruption [Husted, 1999] and thus may be particularly useful for understanding 
whether or not counterfeiting will be accepted by enforcement authorities and 
national governments. In large power distance societies conspicuous consumption 
and flaunting of wealth are tolerated. Status symbols such as counterfeited prestige 
brands, are demanded by consumers to show the world that they hold power. Due to 
a lack of previous empirical studies we would expect that the higher the level of 
power distance in a country, the higher the incidence of counterfeiting. 
 
4.2. Counterfeiting and Hofstede’s individualism 
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According to Hofstede [1991] individualism describes the relationship between 
the individual and the collectivity which prevails in a given society. It is reflected in the 
way people live together – for example, in nuclear families, or tribes; and it has all 
kinds of value implications. In highly individualistic societies, individuals look after 
themselves and their immediate families. In highly collectivistic societies, people are 
strongly integrated  into cohesive in-groups. Although empirical evidence did not 
allow us to infer from these cultural dimensions to counterfeiting, we might predict 
certain things about societies that are at the extremes of these two dimensions. 
We would expect counterfeiters to flourish in individualistic societies. Greater 
product variety and consumption with the purpose of differentiating the purchaser 
from others are also predictable. In collectivist societies, we would predict that 
consumers would use product to convey the status of group membership. Brand 
names are likely to be dominant in collectivist cultures. Due to a lack of previous 
empirical studies we would expect that the more collectivistic (less individualistic) a 
society, the higher the level of counterfeiting in a country. 
 
4.3. Counterfeiting and Hofstede’s masculinity 
Masculinity, with its inverse femininity, looks at how distinctly roles in society 
are defined. It is focused on material success as opposed to concern with the quality 
of life [Hofstede, 1991]. Societies with a masculine orientation focus on 
assertiveness, domination, and high performance. In this orientation, greater 
importance is placed on material things. Big and fast are considered beautiful and 
independence is the ideal. In feminine societies, greater importance is placed on 
relationships and quality of life. Small and slow are considered beautiful and 
interdependence is the ideal. Due to a lack of previous empirical studies we would 
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expect that the importance of material success (masculinity) would, in some cases, 
lead to a greater willingness to purchase counterfeited goods and consequently to 
higher level of counterfeiting in a country. 
 
4.4. Counterfeiting and Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance is defined as the extent to which members of a society 
feel threatened by uncertainty or unknown situations (Hofstede, 1991). People who 
score high along this dimension try to avoid ambiguous situations by establishing 
more rules and policies. Strong uncertainty avoidance societies are more tolerant of 
unfairness and tend to believe in absolute truths. Weak uncertainty avoidance 
societies tend to be less affected by ambiguity and less tolerant of inequality and 
rules. In high uncertainty avoidance countries products are purchased to maintain 
affiliation to the group and innovations are seen as coming from powerful and 
wealthy people. Due to a lack of previous empirical studies we would expect that the 
greater the level of uncertainty avoidance in a country, the higher the incidence of 
counterfeiting in a country. 
 
V. Methodology 
 
The European Commision collects data on all counterfeited goods confiscated 
in the external borders of EU. For every case, the EU customs services record the 
country of origin, type of product and brand, among other characteristics of the 
seizure. Given the illegal nature of counterfeiting, these cases represent only a 
fraction of fraudulent goods entering EU marketplace each year. So, the number of 
cases detected may say more about the efficiency and competency of the EU 
  
13
 
customs authorities than about the level of counterfeiting. However, ambiguity arises 
when there is no agreement about the factors that should be taken into account when 
calculating the scale of counterfeiting [Green and Smith, 2002]. As the resolution of 
these issues are rather dificult and beyond the objectives of this paper, we take the 
data from the European Comission in order to achieve a measure of counterfeiting, 
that is, the number of cases of counterfeited goods detected in the external borders 
of the EU countries. 
We have collected data from the 15 countries of EU in the years 2001, 2002, 
2003 and 2004. The result is a database with 60 observations. Variable CTF 
(Counterfeiting) is the value of imports (in US dollars) in each EU country [LNO, 
2005], divided by the number of cases detected in the external border of that EU 
country [TAXUD, 2006]. Then, a rank variable was created for CTF (Counterfeiting) 
assigning one point if the item was ranked in the first place, two if it was ranked in the 
second place and so on.  
Table 5 displays the rankings for the period 2001/2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Rankings of most counterfeiter countries 
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Countries 2001 2002 2003 2004 
France 2 7 10 6 
Luxembourg 6 4 4 4 
Denmark 3 5 1 5 
Belgium 7 11 7 11 
United 
Kingdom 
8 8 3 8 
Italy 11 15 14 12 
Netherlands 1 9 9 7 
Spain 4 10 11 10 
Austria 9 12 12 2 
Finland 10 2 8 13 
Ireland 14 1 2 3 
Sweden 12 6 5 9 
Portugal 15 13 13 15 
Germany 5 3 6 1 
Greece 13 14 15 14 
 
 
Variables Power Distance (PDI), Individualism (IND), Masculinity (MAS) and 
Incertainty Avoidance (UNA) are measured according Hofstede (1997) values. Then, 
rank variables were created assigning: i) one point for high power distance and 
fourteen points for low power distance; ii) one point for individualism and fourteen 
points for collectivism; iii) one point for masculinity and fourteen points for femininity; 
iv) one point for high uncertainty avoidance and fourteen points for low uncertainty 
avoidance. Luxembourg was excluded due to lack of data on Hofstede’s framework.  
The countries of EU15 are generally characterized by low levels of power 
distance when compared to the median of the countries studied by Hofstede. EU15 
countries tend to be very individualistic (United Kingdom, Netherland, Italy), while 
Portugal, Greece and Spain are very collectivistic. Nordic countries (Sweden, 
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Denmark and Finland) tend to be very feminine, while countries such as Austria, 
Italy, Ireland, UK and Germany are masculine. There is a great deal of variation 
among european countries with respect to the uncertainty avoidance dimension. 
Table 6 displays the rankings for the Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. 
 
 
Table 6. Rankings of Hofstede’s dimensions in EU15 
 
Countries PDI IND MASC UNA 
France 1 6 8 4 
Luxembourg - - - - 
Denmark 13 5 12 14 
Belgium 2 4 7 3 
United 
Kingdom 
8 1 4 11 
Italy 6 3 2 6 
Netherlands 7 2 13 10 
Spain 5 12 9 4 
Austria 14 11 1 7 
Finland 10 10 11 9 
Ireland 12 8 3 11 
Sweden 11 6 14 13 
Portugal 3 14 10 2 
Germany 8 9 4 8 
Greece 4 13 6 1 
Source: Adapted from Hofstede [1991] 
Spearman’s correlation coefficients are calculated to measure the degree of 
association between rank orders from tables 5 and 6. 
 
VI. Results 
Analyzing each of the five correlations (Table 7), it is interesting to note that 
two of the four cultural variables are negatively associated with high power distance 
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and uncertainty avoidance. Countries characterized by lower levels of power distance 
tended to have higher incidence of counterfeiting. In poor countries most of the 
consumers are not willing to pay a considerably higher price for the authentic good if 
the counterfeit item offers similar qualities. Consumers who purchase these goods 
subject themselves to social risk because the goods are of high symbolic value and 
social visibility. However, as long as the counterfeit good is not readily discernible as 
fake, it fulfills its function as well as the authentic item (Nill and Shultz, 1996). 
 
Table 7. Spearman Correlations 
 
 PDI IND MASC UNA N 
CTF01 0,103 0,449 -0,257 -0,178 14 
CTF02 -0,486 0,132 -0,262 -0,692** 14 
CTF03 -0,517 0,416 -0,227 -0,813** 14 
CTF04 -0,543* 0,251 0,266 -0,540** 14 
CTF(01-04) -0,357** 0,320* -0,113 -0,549** 56 
(**) Correlation significant at the 0,01 level (2 – tailed) 
(*) Correlation significant at the 0,05 level (2 – tailed) 
 
Interestingly countries characterized by lower levels of uncertainty avoidance 
tended to have higher incidence of counterfeiting. This intolerance for inequality 
manifests itself in terms of rigidity in the enforcement of intellectual property laws and 
customs efficiency in the detection of counterfeited goods. 
Individualism is positively correlated with counterfeiting, but only for CTF(01-
04). Counterfeiting is tolerated in individualistic societies as individualist traits tend to 
exclusively focus on caring for themselves and their immediate families. We found no 
support for masculinity relationship with counterfeiting. On the basis of these four 
year period results, we can tentatively  describe a cultural profile of a counterfeiter 
country as one in which there is low power distance, low uncertainty avoidance, and 
high individualism.  
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VII. Recommendations and conclusion 
 
The fight against international counterfeiting is a complex phenomenon that 
must be pursued on many fronts. The greatest mistake that can be made is to rely on 
a strategy that depends excessively on actions in a single level (intergovernmental 
agencies, national governments, nonprofit organizations, coalitions of firms, firms). 
Any realistic strategy must start with an explicit recognition that counterfeiting is not 
culture free. This suggests the need for sustained improvements in education and 
income, as well as for social and economic policies that favour law enforcement. 
The role played by intellectual property owners should be analysed at two 
different levels. First, firms must be enrolled in global mutual cooperation such as the 
International Trademark Association (INTA), the International Anti-Counterfeiting 
Coalition (IACC) and the Global Business Leaders’ Alliance Against Counterfeiting 
(GBLAAC), as well as industry specific groups, including the International Federation 
of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) and the Business Software Alliance (BSA) to 
inform governments and politicians in general about the major problems suffered by 
their members and general populations as a consequence of intellectual property 
theft. Second, brand owners need to have its own intellectual property protection in 
place. After that, developing anti-counterfeiting tactics can be a effective way of 
preventing or reducing trademark counterfeiting. This often includes using key 
features on the genuine article that are difficult to copy, such as official seals or 
distinctive detailing. Many brand owners also use the addition of forensic features to 
products or packaging as a means of authentication. This includes overt features 
such as holograms, or covert  features such as invisible fluorescent inks, taggants, 
digital water marking, bar coding or tracking. 
In conclusion, counterfeiting is a worldwide phenomenon with negative 
impacts on host economies and firms doing business internationally. Despite the 
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increasing international concerns (EU, WTO), few systematic studies have been 
undertaken to provide empirical evidence. This paper sheds some light on the impact 
of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (power distance, individualism, masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance) on the attraction of international counterfeiting to European 
Union member countries. Spearman correlations show that some countries’ cultural 
traits are important to international counterfeiters. A cultural profile of a counterfeiter 
country is one in which there is low power distance, low uncertainty avoidance, and 
high individualism.  
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